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Abstract. Distributed ledger and blockchain systems are expected to
make financial systems easier to audit, reduce counter-party risk and
transfer assets seamlessly. The key concept is a token controlled by a
cryptographic private key for spending, and represented by a public key
for receiving and audit purposes. Ownership transfers are authorized
with digital signatures and recorded on a ledger visible to numerous par-
ticipants. Several ways to enhance the privacy of such ledgers have been
proposed. In this paper we study two major techniques to enhance pri-
vacy of token transfers with the help of improved cryptography: Mo¨bius
[35] and CryptoNote [44]. The comparison is illuminating: both tech-
niques use “ring signatures” and some form of “stealth addressing” or
key derivation techniques, yet each does it in a completely different way.
Mo¨bius is more recent and operates in a more co-operative way (with
permission) and is not yet specified at a sufficiently detailed level. Our
primary goal is to explore the suitability of these two techniques for im-
proving the privacy of payments on cryptographic ledgers. We explain
various conflicting requirements and strategic choices which arise when
trying to conceal the identity of participants and the exact details of
transactions in our context while simultaneously enabling fast final set-
tlement of tokens with a reasonable level of liquidity. We show that in
these systems, third-party observers see obfuscated settlement. We finish
with a summary of explicit warnings and advice for implementors of such
systems.
Key Words: applied cryptography, digital tokens, distributed ledger,
blockchain, bitcoin, Ethereum, smart contracts, digital signatures, ring
signatures, CryptoNote, key management, privacy, Stealth Address
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1 Introduction
Money and other assets have been electronic for decades, and it appears
paradoxical that we have very fast (“low-latency”) trading and yet very
slow centralized ownership and final settlement of assets, including cash.
Distributed ledgers (DLs) are an emerging technology that attempts to
solve this problem, and there is the potential for this to create a major
paradigm shift in how financial assets can be stored and transferred.
Ownership and control is promised to become more decentralized and a
new type of distributed and cooperative financial infrastructure is being
planned.
In Nakamoto-type [39] systems using cryptographic tokens (“crypto to-
kens”), these tokens represent coins and are attributed to pseudonymous
entities (typically based on cryptographic public keys). Transfers of own-
ership are performed with digital signatures and recorded on a ledger
composed of blocks visible to numerous participants. High visibility, to-
gether with the imperfect nature of pseudonymity, leads to a loss of
privacy.
In this paper we explore some of the cryptographic technology that is
being used to provide improved privacy for blockchains, and in particu-
lar we study two systems in greater depth: CryptoNote [44] and Mo¨bius
[35]. These systems are viewed as two fundamentally different methods
which use both ring signatures and some form of stealth addressing or
key derivation technique in order to enhance the privacy of asset trans-
fers. In spite of some similarities we show that there are fundamental
differences in how the two systems use public keys and the identities
of transaction participants. Other strong differentiators are co-operative
operation versus the ability to enroll extra participants without their
permission, questions of how they need to rely on additional authentica-
tion and communication channels instead of committing storage to the
blockchain, how they obfuscate the current state of the ledger and the
transaction flow, and how future actions can compromise privacy of pre-
vious transactions. In contrast to the CryptoNote protocol that is used in
at least two major cryptographic currencies (“crypto currencies”) [8, 37],
Mo¨bius is a more recent, substantially simpler, solution that is however
not yet sufficiently specified for practical implementation.
We explore the existence of fundamental trade-offs between settlement,
liquidity and privacy (which includes the privacy of the actual identities
that are linked to pseudonymous cryptograms, the privacy of the details
of individual transactions, and privacy in terms of linkability of separate
transactions). Our goal is to improve the understanding of what such
systems can or cannot do in order to build fast yet private payment and
settlement systems.
This paper is written for a broad audience including blockchain and cryp-
tographic engineers, financial systems engineers and financial services
practitioners. Although appropriate technical terms and vocabulary are
used, mathematical and cryptographic discussions stay at a high (less
detailed) level and in this way the paper aims to enable an increased
understanding of modern financial-cryptographic technology by a broad
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range of stakeholders. We hope that the issues and views raised in this
paper will stimulate debate and we look forward to receiving feedback.
1.1 Outline
This paper explores the interaction between the two worlds of cryp-
togrphic assets and privacy in financial markets. Cryptographic tokens
represent a certain type of new technology push, and the question arises
as to whether these new systems are at all fit for purpose in a prac-
tical commercial context of financial technology. This question is hard
to answer because distributed ledgers are a new and highly disruptive
technology, and because issues of privacy and especially cryptographic
privacy (which is the main area that requires improvement) are tradi-
tionally very difficult and poorly understood.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
emerging ecosystem of cryptographic assets and blockchain privacy; Sec-
tion 3 explores some of the cryptographic technology that is being used
to provide improved privacy for blockchains; Section 4 investigates two
systems in greater depth (CryptoNote and Mo¨bius); Section 5 provides
a broader discussion, facilitated by the detail covered in the previous
sections — including possible improvements to Mo¨bius, and some advice
to implementors (summarised in two tables titled: “Beware Crypto!”);
and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Crypto Assets and Blockchain Privacy
A new form of digital economy has emerged in recent years: an economy
of tokens stored as entries on a distributed or decentralized ledger (“DL”)
[46] where ownership is primarily controlled through cryptographic pri-
vate keys. These cryptographically-controlled tokens (“crypto tokens”)
may be representative of real or abstract quantities, and may be created,
awarded, stored and exchanged [29].
Distributed ledgers have more functionality, and therefore more value
than, merely the possibility to transfer tokens and exchange them against
goods or fiat currency. For example, they can create new forms of control
over a variety of assets. They are able to serve a variety of purposes such
as shared ownership or managing various rights in a distributed software
system or in a business ecosystem. They can convey various combinations
of privileges such as voting, execution of code or scripts by one or many
participants, participation in auctions, or the control of write or read
access rights to data.
In this new form of digital economy transactions typically obey integrity
rules (for example, a rule that a single token can only be transferred
to one other owner — it cannot be “spent twice” by transferring that
single token to two new owners) and these rules may be enforced by a
combination of system software and/or privileged individual or collective
entities (such as “miners” [50]) with discretionary powers to decide which
transactions are eventually accepted.
In a “pure” crypto-token economy, the tokens themselves are valued as-
sets (rather than being representative of some physical asset), and for
practical purposes “ownership” is the ability to exercise control of these
crypto assets on the DL — e.g. to transfer control to another entity.
Pure crypto assets and tokens that represent physical assets may coex-
ist on the same DL, and both will be subject to the force of law in the
appropriate jurisdiction (though determining the applicable law may be
problematic for a DL with nodes in more than one jurisdiction).
The records of the transfer of ownership of crypto tokens are typically
held in a cryptographically-secured “block”, and each new block contain-
ing new records is cryptographically attached to the previous block. A
“blockchain” is therefore a sequence of these connected blocks. The way
that the addition of a new block is agreed and added to the blockchain,
and the finality of that addition, varies between systems. If a block, once
added, can never be removed, and if the chain is strictly linear and can-
not “fork” [38],1 then once the change of ownership of a token has been
agreed and committed to a block on a blockchain, the record of new
ownership is immutable except by the action of a new block added to
the blockchain to record a further transfer of ownership. Thus, addition
of the block to the chain represents finality of the transfer of ownership
within the DL: but if the token represents some physical asset then fi-
nality of transfer on the chain may not align with transfer of ownership
of the real-world asset.
1 Also see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork (blockchain)
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2.1 Crypto Currencies, Native vs. Added Functionality
One of the major applications of crypto tokens is to use them for payment
and as a currency. Such systems are often called “crypto currencies”2 —
for example Bitcoin, Monero and ZCash (also known as ZeroCash). The
Bank for International Settlements views crypto currencies as a subset
of “digital currencies”, where the latter would include any currency in
dematerialised form [3]. Traditional government-issued currencies and
crypto currencies alike can serve as as a medium of exchange, as a unit
of account, and as a store of value. It is hard however to conceal the fact
that they are very far from being similar and natively do not achieve
these three functions equally well. For example most crypto currencies
are traded against each other and against traditional currencies such as
the US Dollar or Euro, and may be used to pay for goods or services and
some merchants actually accept them. However the practicality of using
crypto currencies as a store of value is contentious because of the highly
variable exchange rate against traditional fiat currencies [24].
Most fundamental differences here stem from what is native, and what
needs to be added. The digital world is natively characterized by high
speed, high efficiency, poor security and poor privacy. In contrast, the
physical world is natively characterised by slow speed, poor efficiency,
better security (though protection against forgery has required time to
develop) and better privacy. The basic level of trust between users is low
in both worlds, but in the physical world low trust between users has
been replaced by high trust in central agencies (e.g. banks), regulators,
and the courts of law. Due to the operation of regulation and law, privacy
is quite strong in the physical world, but requires a lot of attention in
the digital world.
Due to the inefficiencies and risk involved in transferring cash in the
physical world, it is mostly avoided and instead the ”transfer” of money
is achieved by changing account balances at each end of the transaction.
Thus, for large transactions between financial institutions there has al-
ready been a de-facto dematerialisation (or digitisation) of cash, and this
dematerialisation depends on the trust relationships between the retail,
commercial and central banks, and with a large number of financial in-
termediaries. Dematerialisation of money is not the same as the creation
of a crypto currency. In most crypto currencies there is a return to the
notion of a currency artefact (a “coin”) rather than relying on the mod-
ification of account balances at each end of a transaction. In a crypto
currency the coin is however a digital artefact, and issues of trust are
established in a new way — rather than trusting in strongly-regulated
intermediaries and the courts of law, users place their trust in cryptogra-
phy and in our ability to secure computer systems against attacks. Thus,
crypto currencies are typically designed to be disintermediated and de-
centralised with no requirement for regulated banks or other financial
intermediaries.
Different crypto currencies may differ in their implementation. The most
well-known is Bitcoin, which provides a transparent ledger with crypto-
2 Or “cryptocurrencies”.
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graphic hashes of public keys serving as pseudonyms (thus, all partici-
pants can see all transactions, but identities are given as numbers derived
from cryptographic keys, not as the names of people or organisations);
Bitcoin also provides a certain (limited) scripting capability, and uses
“miners” who are able to create new coins and approve transactions.
For pure crypto tokens, finality of transfer on the blockchain implies
that once a transfer is recorded on the chain the receiving party should
no longer be exposed to the risk of the sender defaulting (counterparty
risk). However, this also depends on both the contractual agreement
between the blockchain participants and the governing law. The receiver
also remains exposed to the risk that the DL itself may suffer technology
failure, cybersecurity events (theft, crypto bugs), or financial collapse
of the infrastructure provider that is running the DLT. Furthermore, if
there is an intention to trade the crypto asset against a real-world asset
such as a fiat currency, then a store of crypto assets will be subject to
market risk because of the highly volatile exchange rates.
Inter-bank payments. When banks make domestic payments be-
tween themselves, whether on behalf of their clients or on their own
behalf, and whether or not they are linked with some other transfer,3
those payments may be conducted directly between two banks or via
a central bank, and may also involve an intermediary bank. For large
banks it is unlikely that domestic payments would involve more than
one intermediary, whereas cross-border payments may involve several.4
Payments may be effected between banks not as transfers of physical
money but as changes in the recorded debt obligations between two
banks (in “correspondent” banking each bank holds an account with the
other, and the recorded account balances may be modified to reflect a
payment), but if these debt obligations become significantly unbalanced
a real transfer of value is likely to be required.
The difference between a recorded debt obligation (“Bank A agrees that
it owes me £Xm”) and actual value (“Bank A has transferred to me the
ownership, with finality, of a financial instrument worth £Xm”) becomes
important in the case that Bank A becomes unable to pay its debts, or
suffers technical problems that delay Bank A’s ability to turn its debt
obligation to another bank into actual value for that other bank. When a
institution holds money for a client it has a debt obligation to the client
(it must pay the money back on demand or according to the terms of a
commercial agreement), and if it is unable to pay the debt (or any due
interest on the debt) when due this is known as “default” (credit risk).
Fortunately, central banks are notable in that their risk of default (with
a few notable historical exceptions) is very much lower than that of com-
mercial or retail banks. This difference in risk leads to the preference
to settle payments in “central bank money” (i.e. either cash issued by
3 For example, when settling an equities trade, the transfer of ownership of the equities
will be linked to, and occur simultaneously with, the payment for those equities.
4 We will ignore the mechanics of deferred-net and real-time-gross settlement of pay-
ments, except to note in passing the possible need for “liquidity-saving mechanisms”
[34] when using crypto currencies for inter-bank payments.
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a central bank, or an account balance held with a central bank) rather
than “commercial bank money” (i.e. an account balance held with a
commercial bank). Central bank money functions well as a medium of
exchange, with fast real-time settlement available, and as a unit of ac-
count, but functions less well as a store of wealth due to fluctuations in
value (explored further below).5 Commercial bank money also functions
well as a medium of exchange, with fast settlement (slower if deferred
settlement is used), but in terms of a unit of account or a store of value,
commercial bank money may be subject to both (i) the risks associated
with the underlying sovereign (central bank) currency and (ii) the risks
of commercial bank default (explored further below).
Typically a crypto currency coin will be an asset that can be held and
potentially stolen or lost or destroyed. A crypto currency might be de-
signed to incorporate a commercial obligation from the network to pay
the user’s crypto coin account balance back to the user on request,6 and
if it does not do so when due, this would be a “default”. In other cases
however there will be no such guarantee and therefore no “default”.
Some crypto currencies are being used as a medium of exchange, though
their use is not widespread.7 Crypto currency transaction setlement might
eventually be extremely fast, but currently is slow and does not perform
well in terms of bandwidth.8 Crypto currencies do have the potential
to reduce the risks associated with failure of intermediaries, but this
improvement must be balanced against privacy concerns related to in-
creased disclosure. Crypto currencies vary in their design and this will
affect their functionality as a unit of account or a store of wealth.
The risks inherent in different kinds of currency include the following:
Market risk. All currencies suffer market risk in that their exchange
rate with other currencies varies with time. Here we also include liq-
uidity risk: the possibility that demand for a currency becomes very
limited, perhaps even zero, and that this might persist temporarily
or permanently. Some central bank (sovereign) currencies have more
stable exchange rates than others. Commercial bank money is typi-
cally denominated in a sovereign currency and so inherits the market
risk of the denominated currency. Crypto currencies might include a
guaranteed exchange rate to a single sovereign currency, or perhaps
to a basket of foreign currencies, in which case they inherit the mar-
ket risk of that sovereign currency (or those sovereign currencies).
Crypto currencies that do not have guaranteed exchange rates often
have large exchange rate volatility and very high market risk.
Risk of default (credit risk). As explained above, central banks have
very low credit risk, commercial banks have medium credit risk, and
5 Central banks also have other roles such as printing money (e.g. cash) and managing
the economy (e.g. by controlling the amount of cash in circulation).
6 Perhaps as a sovereign currency according to an agreed exchange rate.
7 A list of some shops that accept Bitcoins, compiled in September 2018, is provided
at https://99bitcoins.com/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-companies-stores-take-bitcoins/
8 [2] reports that Visa processes 3,526 transactions per second, whereas Bitcoin pro-
cesses only 3.3 transactions per second (2017 figures). Crypto currency bandwidth
is improving, but remains slow compared with Visa, Mastercard and PayPal.
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crypto currency networks either have high credit risk (e.g. if they
offer a guaranteed exchange rate), or are structured so that they
do not have debt obligations (e.g. with no guarantees) or additional
mechanisms are employed to reduce credit risk.9
Risk of collapse. Central bank money, commercial bank money, and
crypto currency money, are all liable to the risk of collapse. This can
occur as a result of many factors and with both central bank money
and commercial bank money it is likely to be immediately linked to
default. With all currencies, if liquidity drops to zero then collapse
may be imminent. Similarly, adverse exchange rates may cause a
currency to lose substantial value and collapse may soon follow. With
crypto currency money, the network itself might collapse either by
the loss of all users or by some technological fault in the system (for
example, causing all account balances to be lost and unretrievable, or
inability to process transactions). Crypto currencies are particularly
at risk with respect to the immaturity of their technology base.
Risk of inflation, devaluation and demonetisation. The value of
any currency will vary according to other factors that may for ex-
ample be linked to the amount of that currency in circulation and
how frequently the currency is used. The value of central bank money
often reduces over time due to inflation, and its value in relation to
other currencies fluctuates (market risk) and may be forcibly de-
valued. Holders of cash (e.g. individuals and retail businesses) may
also be affected by demonitisation policies: for example, see https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016 Indian banknote demonetisation. With crypto cur-
rencies, similar dynamics may apply in different ways according to
the design decisions for the crypto currency (e.g. fixed versus variable
money supply).
2.2 Distributed Ledger Technology in Financial Markets
As both regulation and competition have increased over the past decade
there has been a drive towards standardisation (and commoditisation)
in the financial markets. DLT is attractive to financial institutions for
several reasons:
– primarily as mechanism for reducing infrastructure costs (including
reduction of compliance costs where DLT provides automation of
compliance reporting);
– to reduce intermediaries (such as correspondent banks) and there-
fore provide faster, less risky and potentially more private payments
(though settlement issues need to be addressed);
– to reduce transaction costs;
– to improve cash management and utilisation (via just-in-time pay-
ments);
– for improved interaction with the broader DLT ecosystem (e.g. where
assets are held on DLT, it may be easier if payments for those assets
are also processed via DLT); and
– to stimulate innovation in new products, services, and workflows.
9 Discussion of such mechanisms is outside the scope of this paper.
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However, there are some potential concerns for the use of DLT in fi-
nancial markets. For example, when a bank currently interfaces with a
centralised payments system, some key regulatory aspects of multilateral
payments processing are the responsibility of the central system, whereas
if a bank were to process multilateral payments itself (in effect, becom-
ing a designated payments system), then the regulatory burden on the
bank might increase in nature or scale. It is not clear how regulatory re-
quirements to destroy data would be managed, nor how that could differ
between participants (for example, if one participant were subject to a
retention hold)?
A financial institution might in future be a participant in many DLs,
each of which may or may not use a blockchain. For each such DL, the
financial institution must choose an implementation mechanism, which
could for example be:
– to host the DL node itself;
– to use a separate infrastructure company to run the DL node (per-
haps owned by and acting as an agent for the financial institution
that it serves) — this could be preferred by banks that wish to seg-
regate risk for operational or regulatory reasons;10 or
– to use an API to connect to a Financial Market Infrastructure11
company (FMI) which will run the node on its behalf (and perhaps
also run the nodes for several other participants).12
2.3 The Importance of Blockchain Privacy
The section starts with two core observations before exploring privacy in
financial markets and for inter-bank payments. The two core observations
(further explained below) are:
Observation 1: Privacy is a fundamental requirement for crypto assets.
Observation 2: Privacy is a technological requirement for scalability.
Privacy as a Fundamental Requirement. The advent of crypto
assets where asset ownership and transactions are recorded and enacted
on a DL, with or without a blockchain, brings a change in risk profile.
A key change for public, unpermissioned, DLs is that owners of digital
assets may become more directly exposed to criminal activity (e.g. as-
sets are no longer protected inside a secure perimeter inside a bank).
Even with private, permissioned, DLs the owners of digital assets are
more directly exposed to the inquisitiveness of other participants and to
external criminal actions if the private DL is successfully breached. Fur-
thermore, in highly regulated areas of business the disclosure of certain
10 For example, a bank might be uncomfortable with processing (validating) payments
for other banks.
11 See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/financial-market-infrastructure-supervision
12 It is unlikely that financial institutions will all embrace the new technology at the
same rate, and it is likely that for a while there will be a mixture of modes of
operation.
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types of data is illegal (and recent European GDPR legislation13 has in-
troduced further widespread legal controls relating to data privacy). An
obvious response to these increased risks is to require yet greater privacy
and security: privacy of asset holdings, privacy of all transaction details
(e.g. sender identity, recipient identity, amount transferred, and time of
transfer), and security against fraud and theft.
Cryptography provides a partial solution, though not devoid of serious
problems. Owning a crypto asset via a private cryptographic key (which
is simply a sequence of bits) is fragile and potentially dangerous. If such
a sequence of bits were to be stolen, the thief could steal the assets con-
trolled by the sequence of bits and there may be no way to recover those
assets. Alternatively, a person with malicious intent could alter the oper-
ation of electronic systems and cryptographic protocols, perhaps causing
damage that requires repair, perhaps rendering the cryptographic keys
useless, or interfering with the ownership of assets and records of whether
transactions are approved or completed. This might make some assets
unrecoverable. Wealthy and/or politically exposed users might be partic-
ular targets for criminal activity if their asset holdings and transaction
are known. Privacy in high demand14. For all the reasons above, it is
worth considering whether there is perhaps a fundamental requirement
to provide a high level of privacy in DL and blockchain systems. In Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.4 we illustrate some of the many pitfalls of cryptographic
security and its implementation.
Privacy as a Technological Requirement. Most existing dis-
tributed ledger systems duplicate storage and computations tremendously:
many different entities do (or check) the same computations again and
again, and this is wasteful. Duplication and decentralization is also un-
dertaken in order to inform market participants about activity in the
markets, which can be imposed by legislators and regulators [11]. Fur-
thermore, a blockchain grows monotonically, with the entire chain being
replicated on all nodes.15 Accordingly, “space” (computer memory) in
blockchains is a precious and therefore expensive resource. From this
point of view many blockchain privacy techniques can be seen as im-
posed by the necessity to decrease the disclosures due simply to the
high price of “publishing” entries in DLs. Privacy appears to be a basic
technological requirement for efficient operation of large-scale, long-lived
DLs.
13 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
14 If privacy is not mandated by regulators, it is likely that commercial competition
will lead to the development of financial services which offer enhanced privacy, in
order precisely to attract these wealthy costumers.
15 Increased usage of computer memory also occurs as a result of slow processing.
For example, for about one month in 2017, just before the BitcoinCash fork, there
was a permanent backlog of up to 200,000 bitcoin transactions which the bitcoin
network was unable to “publish” or approve (see http://blog.bettercrypto.com/?p=3510).
Interestingly this backlog was resolved shortly after the split.
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Privacy in Financial Markets. Many financial markets for trad-
ing assets are “lit” markets where information about orders and trades
are disclosed to market participants. However, not all information is dis-
closed; typically (and importantly) the identities of those who have sub-
mitted orders are not disclosed, and the identities of the counterparties
to a trade are not publicly disclosed.16 When assets are not traded, pri-
vacy is even better and asset holdings are not disclosed. Traditionally,
privacy relating to ownership of assets and details of transactions has
been a matter of trust in and between highly-regulated institutions.
By contrast, modern peer-to-peer systems such as distributed ledgers
have the ability to dispense with such trusted third parties. However,
trust is problematic when dealing directly counterparties, and especially
with multiple pseudonymous counterparties. Therefore many DLT plat-
forms attempt to establish trust via transparency. Many implementations
of DL and blockchain technology increase disclosure and reduce privacy.
The identities of counterparties to a transfer of ownership are often dis-
closed, and asset holdings may also be disclosed (or may be inferred).
The fact that these identities are obfuscated by pseudonyms, and further
via cryptography does not mean that they cannot be derived by other
means, and once the true identities behind the cryptographic keys are
known, comprehensive information becomes readily available. Example
information that may be disclosed includes:
– Some identifiers, e.g. pseudonyms of participants.
– Amounts and types of assets being transferred.
– Account balances and various statistics about their age, probability
distribution, velocity, mobility etc.
– Timing and linking of transactions.
This leads to important data leaks during operation with progressive ero-
sion of privacy via future events. The goal of many improved DL/blockchain
solutions is to mitigate rather than completely remove these disclosures
(which may be impossible or require a fundamental redesign of the entire
DL/blockchain system). Unfortunately cryptographic technology can not
solve all practical problems equally well. Cryptography makes unbreak-
able locks in areas of encryption,17 and it can do integrity and authen-
ticity extremely well for business purposes.18 However cryptography is
weak when trying to achieve more difficult objectives, and struggles to
solve privacy problems in a definitive and clear-cut way; it will obfuscate
instead of concealing completely.
Privacy for Inter-bank Payments. Current systems for inter-
bank payments do not provide complete privacy: domestic payments may
16 However, a large number of intermediaries know key information: for example, bro-
kers, custodians, clearing houses, settlement banks, and potentially several corre-
spondent banks involved during the processes of settlement and payment.
17 With decades of maturity since the Second World War, encryption technology is
extremely strong — when used — in contrast almost nothing is ever encrypted in
blockchain systems.
18 Digital signatures do an extremely good job of ensuring the integrity of transactions.
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pass through FMI systems, intermediary (correspondent) banks, and the
central bank. The current systems are also not entirely risk-free (for
example, the use of a correspondent bank introduces exposure to the
risk of that bank failing). And revealing data to a correspondent bank
can be of more concern than revealing data to an FMI, despite regulatory
control, due to the aggressive competition between many banks.
There are many drivers of privacy concerns for payments between large
financial institutions. For example, there are regulatory concerns regard-
ing the confidentiality of certain types of data (and requirements to delete
certain data), and participation in a DL would provide more direct ex-
posure of that data (both because of the transparency requirements of
the consensus mechanism and because the protection of data cannot be
entirely controlled by each bank if it is replicated at other bank nodes).
There are also commercial and operational drivers:
Commercial drivers of privacy concerns. The requirement to retain
privacy of information such as transaction amounts and trading strate-
gies is often driven by competitive imperatives, such as the desire to re-
duce predatory action by other banks.19 For example, during a systemic
event such as a credit crunch, payments might be controlled due to cash
liquidity issues and a particularly constrained bank might be detected
from network activity. In general, analysing patterns in large numbers of
payments over time (together with other sources of information)20 may
detect a change in behaviour indicating an exploitable vulnerability that
could be incrementally explored, for example by delaying payments, ap-
plying commercial pressure during contract negotiations, or reducing the
market value of assets the bank is known to hold and may need to sell.
Operational drivers of privacy concerns. The migration from legacy
payments infrastructure to a DL/blockchain infrastructure raises serious
new concerns relating to privacy and security. With traditional infras-
tructure, the data and processes to be protected are either fully controlled
by the financial institution or by a highly-regulated FMI. By contrast,
with a DL/blockchain architecture the data and processes will be repli-
cated across a large number of participating financial institutions. The
immediate concerns relating to a DL/blockchain architecture are:
1. The weakest link risk: that security/privacy of a bank’s data and pro-
cesses with respect to external attackers will depend on the security
and privacy afforded by the least secure participating institution.
2. The lack of privacy risk: that sensitive data and processes will be
replicated across all participating institutions and may become known
to all institutions
19 Privacy from other banks is often viewed as more important than privacy from FMIs,
who are often assumed not to have predatory intent.
20 A bank’s payments reflect a mix of its own business and that of its clients; some
information about a bank may be derivable from network activity but not necessarily
full information. However, where other information is available that can be correlated
with payments information then it may become possible to infer a bank’s business
separately from that of its clients.
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3. The obfuscation risk: that “privacy via cryptographic obfuscation”
(less than via strong encryption) will not provide sufficient privacy
to match banking requirements, which are more stringent than for
many other industries.
4. The operational scale risk: that the amounts of data involved (e.g.
in terms of holding transaction data for all other participating in-
stitutions, on an ever-increasing blockchain, forever) and their op-
erational integrity might be prohibitively expensive to manage. The
processing requirements and required system availability and secu-
rity might be similar to providing the operational availability of CLS
functionality at each node. Blockchain compression will therefore be
an important consideration, and one way to achieve blockchain com-
pression is increased privacy (less shared data on the blockchain).
5. The validation burden risk: that there might be additional burdens
involved in holding/processing data for a validation-only purpose
(i.e. not as a counterparty to a trade) for other institutions:
– there might be an additional regulatory burden (due to becom-
ing a regulated payments infrastructure provider);
– there might be an additional staff oversight burden;
– a new privacy policy would be necessary for other data which
is now replicated on the institution’s own node (including pro-
tection/retention/deletion), and a new data processing policy
would be necessary for the institution’s validation activities;
– it is currently unknown whether there might be a regulatory dif-
ference between “seeing” data versus “holding a copy” of data,
and whether the encryption of this data would relax the regula-
tory obligations;
– there might be a “guilty knowledge” risk (i.e. the holding of
data for other participants might imply responsibility to check
and potentially act on that data, so ignoring the data is risky);
– there will doubtless be a network agreement such that each par-
ticipant will have a responsibility to the whole DL network, and
there might be a financial or reputational risk if a node were
temporarily unable to engage21 or if it were compromised by
hackers.
Currently, a precautionary principle is used in that data is only shared
with those that “need to know”. Although compliance reports must be
made to regulators, the need for privacy in financial transactions has
been highlighted by the Bank of England’s privacy objective which is to
explore “how DLT based systems could be configured to ensure that no
21 If a large financial institution’s node were to fail, it would take a prohibitively long
time to recreate the node by copying data from another node, and therefore every
node would keep its own full backup of all data and it is likely that this would
be configured with a “shadow” node running in another location ready to take over
immediately following failure of the primary node (i.e. each institution would operate
two nodes). Thus one of the advertised benefits of DL/blockchain systems — that
all data is automatically backed-up in multiple locations — would not hold in this
use case.
13
party (except for the regulator) was able to infer details about trans-
actions which they were not counterparty to, including ensuring that
participants in the consensus process did not have full visibility of trans-
action details”.22
2.4 Difficult Choices for Blockchain Privacy
Implementing blockchain privacy is not straightforward, since transparency
(contrary to privacy) is one way to establish trust where the participants
do not trust each other (which might hold regardless of whether the sys-
tem is permissioned or permissionless).23 Yet privacy remains in high
demand when the participants do not trust each other. Here we discuss
some of the issues that arise when attempting to introduce privacy into
a system where trust is problematic.
Privacy. Specific aspects of privacy in a blockchain context include the
following:
– Are the main/fundamental (as opposed to ephemeral) identities of
participants protected?
– Can different transactions by the same sender be linked?
– Can different transactions sent to the same recipient be linked?
– Is it possible for an attacker to exploit timing side channels (timing
and amounts of transactions)?
– Is it possible for an attacker (or anyone other than the counterparties
to a transaction) to see the amounts and timing of a transaction?
– Are the holdings of crypto tokens protected against theft and are
larger holders protected from unnecessary exposure?
– When transactions are validated, who does the validation and how
much data do they see?
– Are transaction histories protected?
Where protection is claimed, it is important to consider how such protec-
tion is provided, and how that protection could potentially be attacked
and subverted. It is also important to understand the difference between
different strengths of cryptographic encryption and the limitations of
cryptographic obfuscation.
Privacy and Integrity. Regardless of issues of trust between partic-
ipants, all participants must be able to trust the integrity of the tech-
nology platform. The main integrity questions to consider, and some
implications for privacy, are:
– Is ownership of crypto tokens secure so that each crypto token al-
ways has a legitimate owner and the legitimate owner (and only the
legitimate owner) can control that token (e.g. for a crypto currency,
each coin has an owner, and only the owner can spend the coins and
in doing so transfers ownership to the recipient)?
22
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/fintech/chain.pdf
23 For permissioned systems where the participants are non-competitive and fully trust
each other, privacy is easier to establish.
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– Furthermore can this be ensured and audited without revealing the
ownership of all tokens and with the transaction current state and
past history remaining obfuscated?
– Are withdrawals and spending operations unique and can acciden-
tal or intentional double spending be detected? How can this be
achieved without disclosing any details of the transaction to other
participants?
– Do the inputs and outputs of each transaction match, so that crypto
tokens can neither be created from nothing nor destroyed? How can
this be achieved without disclosing the details of the transaction?
– Does the system incorporate additional audit mechanisms (e.g. so
that a regulator can view the details of all or selected transactions),
and if so how is this achieved without further compromising the
privacy of participants?
– Does the system ensure that operations are not vulnerable to mis-
behaviour of particular network participants? For example, is the
blockchain consensus algorithm secure against abuse by powerful
entities?
– If fraud occurs can it be detected rapidly and remedied before any
harm is done?
– Can it be remedied in real-time without imposing a burden on inno-
cent users?
– If the system requires additional off-chain channels to be used, how
(if at all) does the system support the authentication of those chan-
nels? Does the use of off-chain channels improve privacy, and if so
how?
For each of the above questions, it is also important to establish the
details of how these aspects are assured, including all assumptions and
premises, in order to determine the degree to which the technology plat-
form can be trusted (and in which specific ways the technology could
fail?).
Privacy and Performance. System design choices might lead to
various trade-offs between privacy and performance, as discussed below:
Synchronisation Scalability: Distributed robust and trustless systems
tend to have poor performance due to the complexity of achieving syn-
chronisation — this requires both a logical consensus on what transac-
tions should be included in a new block to be added to the blockchain
and a technical synchronisation of all of the nodes in the distributed
ledger [10, 31]. As the number of elements requiring consensus increases,
the time taken for consensus may increase. Similarly, if complex crypto-
graphic procedures for improved privacy are incorporated into the con-
sensus mechanism then the time taken for consensus is likely to increase
(and time to detect fraud may increase).
BlockChain Compression: One major topic of interest (and also a di-
rect metric of achievement in blockchain privacy) is that of blockchain
compression. Many privacy techniques can be seen as a method for com-
pressing (reducing the amount of data stored on) the blockchain, in that
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only a small amount of information is stored on the blockchain (visi-
ble to all participants) and an extra, larger, amount of data is stored
of communicated off-chain (visible to a smaller subset of participants).
For example in Payment Channels [5], only final digital signatures need
to be published on the blockchain, and other data does not need to be
published. In Stealth Address techniques such as are used in CryptoNote
[19] (see Sections 3.7 and 4.1), an Extended Public Key (EPK) of the
recipient is sent privately by the recipient to the sender, and this EPK
will never appear on the public ledger. Compression is also a key feature
in the design of Mo¨bius (see Section 4.2) and in general compression has
important consequences for the overall performance of a DL because the
data stored on the blockchain must be replicated on every node in the
DL.
Privacy, Settlement and Liquidity. A major question in the pay-
ment and settlement of crypto currencies is the question of liquidity. This
has two aspects: (i) liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs) that reduce the
overall amounts of crypto coins that must be transferred by calculating
and settling net rather than gross amounts, and (ii) the ability to dispose
immediately of settled crypto coins which are guaranteed to be available.
Here we consider the latter aspect, and do not have good news: both of
the systems24 that we study (CryptoNote and Mo¨bius) trade privacy for
the availability of crypto tokens in the form of finally settled and spend-
able coins. For example in Mo¨bius the recipient’s identity is obfuscated
by “mixing” together a certain number of identical transfers, so that it is
not possible to know connect the identities of senders and the identities
of the recipients. However, this only works if there is a sufficiently large
number of participants willing to participate in this mixing activity. A
recipient might be required to wait until a sufficiently large number of
transactions are deposited into the same smart contract and ready to be
withdrawn.25 This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.
24 And also ZeroCash.
25 A related issue is that a bank may wait in order to withdraw money from a certain
contract for as long as they don’t need this money, but not longer, potentially leading
to timing side channels that may be exploited to more or less reliably relate the
identities of the participants to other events in financial systems.
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3 Crypto Methods for Blockchain Privacy
Here we review some key cryptographic methods (“crypto methods”)
for blockchain privacy: digital signatures, ring signatures, key manage-
ment and key derivation techniques, and stealth addresses (also known
as stealth keys). Since not all significant details can be included, we will
focus on aspects that might be misunderstood and require elucidation.
Some important observations to start with (further explained below) are:
Observation 1: Digital signatures provide elegant ways to separate the
control of assets or ability to spend (using “private” keys) from the ability
to verify the financial transactions (using “public” keys).
Observation 2: Blockchain transactions are not encrypted by default and
are largely intelligible so that the financial integrity of the shared ledger
can be audited independently by numerous network or blockchain partic-
ipants.
Observation 3: Whereas pseudonymity was the initial layer of obfuscation
in blockchain technology (concealing the actual owners of public keys),
ring signatures now add another layer of obfuscation. We will explain
how ring signatures allow the signer 26 to remain anonymous in a very
strong sense, but only within a certain relatively small set of users, which
can be eroded with time.
3.1 Digital Signatures
A typical setup for public key cryptography is that a user has a private
key a and a public key A that is shared with other participants. Assuming
this user creates a Digital Signature σ over a message m, this can be
described as a mathematical puzzle or an equation to solve:
V erif(A, σ,m) = 0
such that only one unique27 entity or person (the legitimate signer who
knows his or her private key a) is able to solve this puzzle (see Sec-
tion 3.2). By contrast, once σ is given anyone who knows the public key
A can check if the solution is correct by checking the verification equa-
tion. For a crypto currency, a digitally signed transaction m produced by
the owner of a can be verified and accepted by anyone, and coins can be
irreversibly transferred from the owner of a to a new recipient B stated
in the signed transaction, which B will typically be another public key.
This is very much like signing a cheque except that a digital signature is
used.
3.2 Solving the Puzzle and Security Requirements in
Digital Signatures
It is important to see that the term “solve the puzzle” has more than
one meaningful definition. It is about creating a signature σ such that
26 In CryptoNote the signer will be the sender transferring coins and this mechanism
is protecting the privacy of the signer. In Mo¨bius on the contrary it benefits the
receiver who signs a withdrawal from the smart contract.
27 We call this property non-repudiation or imputability.
17
V erif(A, σ,m) = 0. The function V erif() must be sufficiently complex
to resist sophisticated attack, i.e. to ensure that only the owner of the
key pair a,A can produce the signature σ and this signature cannot be
forged by an attacker. The seminal paper of Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest
[27] was the first to provide rigorous definitions of different levels of
attack (forgery) and therefore a way to measure the strength of protec-
tion provided by different versions of the function V erif(). “Universal
forgery” is where an attacker can create any message of his choice and
successfully forge a signature σ to make it appear that the message comes
from the owner of the key pair a,A. In real life crypto currency use cases,
the main threat would be a so called “selective forgery”: signing some
specific messages and irreversibly transferring funds. In real life crypto
currency use cases, the main threat would be such “selective forgery”
irreversibly transferring funds. Then we have an “existential forgery” an
attacker can successfully forge a signature for any or at least one mes-
sage m even though this is then likely to be random or irrelevant. In
cryptography, the philosophy is that this (stronger) security definition
is required systematically. Interestingly, contrary to the claim inside the
paper [27], it did not provide the “most general” or the strongest pos-
sible definition. This is known as the problem of “duplicate signatures”
— producing a duplicate signature for a message that has already been
signed by the legitimate signer. Many digital signature schemes includ-
ing ECDSA used in current blockchains systems [1] remain vulnerable to
this type of attack.
3.3 Ring Signatures
In ring signatures, we have a group of N signers28 and using this
simplified description the equation can be written as
V erif(A1, . . . AN , σ,m) = 0
where anyone who knows just one of the private keys ai can solve the
puzzle to create σ, and once σ is known anyone can check that the
solution is correct (thereby proving that one of the owners of A1, . . . AN
is the signer of m).
Ring Signatures: Anonymity vs. Linkability. Ring signatures
are “signer-ambiguous” in that there is no way to know which signer
signed the message — if N is very large, this offers very strong anonymity
guarantees, but clearly no anonymity at all if N = 1. This is used in some
digital currencies, for example in CryptoNote-based coins such as Mon-
ero. The following simplistic example (which is not yet quite complete
or secure, as we explain below) illustrates one basic and quite standard
way (cf. CryptoNote protocol) in which ring signatures can be used in
order to authorize monetary transfers:
28 Who do not need to be present, and whose identity can be used without their
permission.
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– A user Ax who wishes to transfer coins to user Ay will create a
transaction containing the recipient or destination29 public key Ay,
and sign this transaction using a ring signature for a well-chosen30
subset of N users.
– The ring signature proves that the transaction comes from one of
the N users without revealing the precise sender’s identity.
– All users scan every transaction to see whether it contains a transfer
to them, using their public key only.
– Here, the recipient (e.g. characterized by his public key) of a transfer
is known and recorded on the blockchain. The recipient’s private key
can be used to transfer the coins further.
In this example, the ring signature is able to conceal the identity of the
sender and not more. All other data about this transaction are visible.
The sender is only known to be one of a (hopefully large) group of users.
Since the sender can create a ring signature using other user’s identities
without their permission, the sender should be able to choose a large
group within which to hide.
In general, a ring signature has a limited objective: to ensure the privacy
of the signer. If the signer is the sender, then the receiver’s privacy is not
ensured, and vice versa.
Crucial Difficulty: Moreover there is a major problem with the ap-
proach above which was not solved or not yet. a key problem is that
during the lifetime of this system31 we do not know which coins are al-
ready spent or not32 The answer is quite surprising, we do not need to
know (!), as long as we have the ability to prevent every single user
from spending his coins twice. For this we will need “linkable ring
signatures” further33 explained below in Section 3.4.
3.4 Linkable Ring Signatures
In this type of ring signature, an additional mechanism is used to pre-
vent double processing of any UTXOs or deposit. The digital signature
contains an additional piece of data that assists in the detection of du-
plicate transactions, so that subsequent duplicates can be disallowed.
This mechanism degrades the signer privacy very slightly: just the right
amount in order to detect errors or fraud and not more. A cryptogram34
29 It can be any public key and does not have to be any of A1, . . . , AN in the ring or
group specified above, and it could furthermore be something different than a key,
for example a script or a smart contract in Ethereum identified by a cryptographic
hash.
30 It makes sense only to include public keys which currently have a balance at least
equal to the monetary value to be transferred.
31 As in the simple example above, similar to CryptoNote.
32 In Mo¨bius this would be rather like which deposits were already withdrawn.
33 Moreover even this may be not sufficient in order to achieve financial integrity and
avoid double spending, which question is studied below in Section 3.5.
34 This word means that it is generated using a cryptographic technique. It is not
meant to be used to transmit message to be “decrypted” by another user but rather
to ensure correct operation and avoid prevent double spending attacks.
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known as key image (also known as a “linking tag”) I is produced which
is uniquely linked to the sender’s private key a, using a one-way func-
tion f (whose value does not reveal a), a value d that is studied later in
Section 4.1, and maybe other information (omitted from this simplified
explanation) so that if I is the same for any two transactions only the
first will be processed:
I = f(a, d)
The verification of this key image I is already embedded inside the pri-
mary equation Verif used to verify the signatures. To show this we can
write:
V erif(A1, . . . AN , I, σ,m) = 0
In practice I is frequently omitted because by convention I will be al-
ready included as a mandatory field inside the specification of σ.
We need to stress the importance of the fact that I is present and
that all checks which involve I must be performed systematically by
all the parties involved. Omission would be fatal, see Table 2 page 41,
and would lead to double spending. This double-spending detection is
done by a seemingly very simple algorithm sometimes called RS.Link
[35] or LNK [44] which essentially detects if a given I was previously
used and recorded on the blockchain. If it has previously been seen, this
is a double-processing attempt and the blockchain should simply reject
the second (later) spending attempt.
This apparent simplicity hides a serious security question. There should
be no way for the signer to cheat; for example to produce a fake key
image I which would compromise the detection (and rejection) of a du-
plicate transaction and therefore enable double-spending of his coins.
This is ensured by the fact that the key image is a part of the (ring) dig-
ital signature, and its correctness is checked by verifying the appropriate
signature verification equation(s) V erif . Informally, the whole digital
signature is also a proof of knowledge, showing that the person spending
coins knows the right private key, and that this same key is also used
to compute this exact key image. It is a subtle solution and it is not
easy to see if a linkable ring digital signature scheme does all this cor-
rectly (thereby making this type of fraud impossible). The only method
currently known which gives a comprehensive assurance is a detailed
cryptographic security proof. This is necessary and yet not sufficient.
3.5 Difficulties with Application of Ring Signatures
In fact even in the presence of such a security proof there may be doubts
as to whether it is actually correct, and whether the abstract security
result has been interpreted correctly, and whether it is a meaningful secu-
rity result that can be applied correctly in a real-life setting. In general,
both CryptoNote and Mo¨bius are quite complex and intuitively it is very
hard to see if they are actually secure. Another question is whether the
system has precisely and correctly specified in which circumstances I
should be identical in order to trigger rejection. In both cases the au-
thors have modified and adapted a ring signature scheme developed by
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different cryptography researchers, which means that their security can
no longer be endorsed by the original authors and should not be taken
for granted.
Further Difficulties: In general a (linkable) ring signature must be
integrated with the rest of the crypto currency implementation in order
to address the issue of financial integrity correctly and all aspects of the
design must work together. It is NOT true that an integrity property
such as above is easy to achieve with just some crypto “magic” solution
such as a ring signature used as a black box. It is NOT sufficient for the
ring signature scheme to be cryptographically secure (or provably secure)
and a practical application of a cryptographic solution may invalidate35
the security result. This happens for example when the tool is used in
situations not anticipated 36 by the designers37 and whether we are able
to accurately and convincingly reduce a broader financial integrity of
a payment system to a pure crypto security property (an impossibility
result).
35 The financial integrity may be broken for reasons of the inadequacy of the crypto-
graphic modelling which is used in order to argue or prove security.
36 For example, due to special events which may have been artificially excluded from
security modelling by crypto researchers or considered as happening with a negligible
probability.
37 For example in CryptoNote we would require a guaranteed 1:1 correspondence be-
tween public keys and unspent transaction outputs. This is likely to lead to real life
events which the cryptographic model could have omitted to consider.
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3.6 Key Management and Key Derivation
Key management and key derivation techniques are primarily used to en-
hance the privacy of the receivers of assets. The main goal is to achieve
a disconnection between the cryptographic identity (usually in the form
of a “master” cryptographic public key) and the “child” identities actu-
ally used in one or (for better privacy) several transactions to transfer
coins that are recorded on the blockchain. Key questions to study are
(i) blockchain compression (blockchain storage space is an expensive re-
source), (ii) how the “master” keys can be communicated using addi-
tional communication channels and how to secure their authenticity and
(iii) how the receiver is able to see the incoming payments (independently
of the ability to spend them) given that we aim to conceal them as much
as possible38.
Key Management Introduction. The necessity to use several
pseudonyms comes from the poor anonymity of existing blockchain sys-
tems. Attempted solutions to the anonymity problem can create a fur-
ther problem: the fragmentation of assets which are stored at various
pseudonymous/public keys which leads to high fees when transferring
those assets and may also lead to “consolidation” transactions which
may reverse the privacy obtained earlier. Practical implementations of
the privacy provisions in Mo¨bius [35], CryptoNote [44] and ZeroCash [45]
all either already have or are likely to have this problem. We are not yet
aware of a truly well-designed anonymity solution for blockchain privacy
that would be devoid of problems and inherently secure39.
Advanced key management techniques were first used in Bitcoin to di-
versify the keys to be used in different transactions, and then to develop
hierarchical key management methods [15, 17] with so called “Audit Ca-
pabilities”. These capabilities allow third parties to derive public keys
from certain “master public keys” without knowledge of the private keys.
More recently, “Stealth Address” techniques have become popular and
these techniques have an additional major objective: to increase privacy
for the receivers of payments. We refer to [19] and to [15–17, 23, 28] for
a detailed study on the topics of key management emerging in crypto
currencies and in the industry at large. In this paper we focus on the
basic features and how key derivation could or should be performed in
order to benefit specific use cases involving asset storage, exchange and
settlement.
Key Management with Audit: Main Principle. We outline the
primary methods used in creating “Auditable” key management (some-
times called “Type 2 techniques” [15, 17]). The property we need is to
be able to derive public keys without reference to the private keys, or
38 But not more: we are not willing to risk that the receiver will not see some incoming
payments, which is a potential problem — see Section 3.7.
39 This would mean secure in every case, independently on how it is implemented and
used. Provable security does not solve this problem.
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rather do both in bulk from a “Master” public key40 and a “Master” pri-
vate key, together with two key Child Key Derivation (CKD) functions:
a “Private CKD” function and a “Public CKD” function as illustrated
in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. General key derivation principle from [15] with modified no-
tations. It must be such that the diagram commutes and public keys
Ki obtained either way are identical. The generator G produces pub-
lic keys from private keys, e.g. K3 = k3 ·G.
The crucial property is then that the corresponding lower level keys
match. This property means that our diagram in Figure 1 should com-
mute, i.e. that CKDpublic,i(kˆ · G) = (CKDprivate,i(kˆ)) · G. In [15] it is
also required that all the 4 derivations in Figure 1 are one-way functions
and therefore for example the public master key/seed should not reveal
the private master key/seed (nor indeed any of the private keys).
It possible to see that such solutions can be deployed at several levels and
lead to Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) solutions where more complex
multi-level diagrams will also commute [15, 17, 52]. Such systems can be
studied in terms of “security domains” or partially ordered sets which
allows for information flow analysis [15].
Key Management with Audit: Solutions. The main idea in con-
structing such key derivation schemes is that both derivation functions
are essentially the same (and have the same inputs). Private keys and
public keys are modified in a consistent way, and algebraic homomorphic
properties of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are used. There exist
two basic methods: multiplicative and additive. Their history goes back
to June 2011, a date when the forum thread “Deterministic Wallets”
was started41 by Greg Maxwell. The multiplicative solution was pro-
posed first and was used in various systems such as Electrum. Since April
40 Sometimes a word “SEED” is used instead of the word “key”, and sometimes other
terms such as “Extended” Public/Private Key are used [15, 17]. In this paper we
prefer to use the term of “Master” keys.
41 Cf. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=19137.0
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2013 there was a shift towards the additive method, which is claimed to
be faster and easier to implement [52], and which became standardized
inside the BIP032 specification.42
Definition 3.61 (The Multiplicative CKD Method). The multi-
plicative method has a Private CKD function:
k(x) = (kˆ ·H(kˆ.G, x)) mod Q
and the multiplicative method Public CKD is:
K(x) = H(Kˆ, x).Kˆ in E(IFP )
where Kˆ = kˆ.G, and where H() is a hash-to-point function with output
reduced mod Q, and K(x) will be a point on the elliptic curve E(IFP ).
Definition 3.62 (The Additive CKD Method). The additive method
has a Private CKD function:
k(x) = (kˆ +H(kˆ.G, x)) mod Q
and the additive method Public CKD is:
K(x) = Kˆ +H(Kˆ, x).G in E(IFP )
We refer to [19] for a proof of correctness of these two methods.43
Security. All these methods are subject to “bad random44” and other
cryptographic attacks in which coins may eventually be stolen if certain
specific events happen [15]. They are potentially secure in ideal circum-
stances where all random numbers are perfectly random, where keys
passwords and identities are not re-used, and where audit keys are not
leaked to attackers. In the real world a certain small percentage of keys
will45 be compromised. Later in 2014-17 two improved solutions with
extra robustness against attacks were proposed: a multi-key multiplica-
tive method of [28] and a mixed additive-multiplicative Robust Stealth
Address solution of [19].
Further Problems with CKD. There are at least two problems
with using a simple Child Key Derivation (CKD) technique as illustrated
in Figure 1. First, it uses only symmetric cryptography, where both CKD
functions must share the same secret (such as Kˆ), which strongly limits
what can be achieved (many advanced security techniques require asym-
metric cryptography). Second, it lacks “freshness” for different opera-
tions and operates in an old-fashioned uni-directional “Key Transport”
42
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki
43 Mo¨bius ([35], Definition 2.1) uses an additive method, where a hash is added to the
private key. The paper uses unusual multiplicative notations which are rarely used
for ECC and which make it not completely apparent.
44 Exploitation of real-life events due to the imperfect generation of numbers that are
required to be random.
45 See for example http://blog.bettercrypto.com/?p=1099
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communication model46 and it does not exploit the full power of inter-
action between the participants which would enable better security47.
3.7 Asymmetric-Symmetric Stealth Address.
The basic Stealth Address (S.A.) technique was invented by user “byte-
coin” in the Bitcoin forum on 17 April 2011 where it immediately at-
tracted the attention of a Bitcoin core developer Mike Hearn [9]. In
summary:
– The recipient has a private key b and public key B = b.G and the
sender has a private key a and public key A = a.G
– A Diffie-Hellman key exchange [22] allows both the sender and the
recipient to compute a shared secret value S while communicating
over an insecure communications channel such that:48
S = a.B = b.A
The sender calculates S = a.B and the receiver calculates S = b.A.
– Both sender and receiver use the same one-way hash function H and
the same modulus Q to hash the shared secret to get an ephemeral
private key c = H(S) mod Q, and to generate an ephemeral public
key C = c.G for the subsequent transfer.
Figure 2 illustrates a possible variant of how this might operate in prac-
tice (with several problems that will be discussed below):
Step 1: The sender retrieves the recipient’s static public key B from
the blockchain or elsewhere (e.g. the Internet).
Step 2: The sender computes the ephemeral S.A. C = c.G (where c =
H(S) based on the calculated shared secret S) and sends a blockchain
transaction to that address.
Step 3: The sender informs the recipient (via an off-chain channel) that
a transaction has been sent [optional].
Step 4: The recipient calculates the ephemeral S.A. C = c.G (where
c = H(S) based on the shared secret S) and retrieves the transaction
from the blockchain.
We call this technique “Asymmetric-Symmetric” because it uses asym-
metric cryptography, yet it is highly symmetric in the way in which both
participants operate; for example both can spend the coins, which is not
ideal for the receiver as we will see below. *
46 Key Transport was one of the dominant methods of secure communication used
in encrypted Internet communications. It has been discontinued since 2014 by The
Internet Engineering Task Force [41].
47 Broadly speaking, better security is achieved through limiting the damage which
can be done if some particular devices or keys are compromised and extends to the
resistance against quantum computers by fragmenting the attack, creating larger
numbers of keys, and reducing the potential economical gain from compromising
one key.
48 And S ∈ E(IFP ) — i.e. S is a point on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
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This sort of technique or similar simple variants are widely used. Now
the devil is in the details and we will see below that this technique
admits numerous variants which are far from being equal with respect
to usability, security and privacy. We make the following observations on
the original S.A. method (see also [19]):
Fig. 2. A possible variant of our basic Stealth Address technique which
however suffers from several problems as discussed in the text [picture
by Killian Davitt].
Security issue 1: reuse of A. The first problem occurs when the sender
uses his or her permanent identity A to receive several payments,
which might become linked to each other49. Later variants of this
technique such as [44] and [48] make it clear that we need to do some-
thing different. What is recommended in [44, 48] is to use a random
ephemeral “nonce” key-pair.50 We denote such an ephemeral nonce
key-pair by r,R. In this case the value R must be transmitted with
the transaction which increases the blockchain space required [49].51
Security issue 2: “sender-spending” attacks. A second serious is-
sue with the original method (previously discussed in [9] and fixed
49 This may not be obvious because additional data are not made public.
50 A nonce is an arbitrary number that can only be used once, and a nonce key-pair is
an arbitrary key-pair that can only be used once.
51 One method to publish extra data in Bitcoin is to use the op return instruction
where arbitrary data can be placed in the outputs of Bitcoin transactions [49].
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in all later proposals [44, 48]) is that the coins are stored on the
blockchain and can be spent by whoever knows the private key c —
in this scheme both the sender and the receiver can spend because
both can compute the private key c [9, 48, 18]. Therefore if the re-
ceiver does not spend the coins immediately or is offline, the sender
can change his or her mind and take the money back. This is not
always a threat because the blockchain can require additional proof
to withdraw the funds (e.g. in ZeroCash).
The necessity for out-of-band storage and communication. In
Figure 2, Step 1 illustrates a third issue in using basic S.A. techniques
where we store the recipient identity on the blockchain. In fact, Step
1 in Figure 2 is often expected to happen off-blockchain (for example,
this is how Mo¨bius is expected to operate). For example we visit a
merchant’s web site and download their digitally signed permanent
S.A. and install the merchant as our recipient (very much like adding
a recipient in PGP or a certificate in a web browser). Then we can
engage in multiple transactions with this recipient without linking
these transactions in any way: neither to the content of their web
site, nor to any other payment sent by ourselves or others to the
same recipient, nor to any other information available in the public
blockchain.
Recognising incoming transactions. Step 3 of Figure 2 is not nec-
essary,52 since the recipient can alternatively monitor the blockchain
for incoming transactions (also see [18, Slides 18–25]). In all cases
the receiver can actively monitor the blockchain or other channels
for all plausible A and check if somebody is sending coins to some
H(b.A).G or in some cases also to some H ′(H(b.A).G) each of which
he or she can recompute and compare. If detected, he or she can
spend all such transaction outputs (coins).
On the other hand, monitoring the blockchain for the incoming pay-
ments means that the private key of the recipient is used more fre-
quently and is therefore more exposed to theft or side channel at-
tacks, which is not ideal. The solution is to move towards yet more
advanced “Dual-Address” S.A. methods, see Section 3.9 (which is
already implemented in CryptoNote 2.0 [44]).
3.8 Improved Stealth Address Methods
Improved basic method. An improved basic method (which is ex-
tended by an additive key management technique in the sense of Defi-
nition 3.62) fixes a couple of the problems studied above. This method
was first described by Nicolas van Saberhagen in the CryptoNote white
paper which appears to be from October 2013 [44] and in January 2014
it was adapted to the Bitcoin specification [48].
1. The recipient has a public key B = b.G
2. The sender uses a one-time nonce pair r,R where R = r.G, and r
is random mod Q. (This avoids disclosing the sender’s permanent
identity A multiple times).
52 This step is advocated yet optional for Mo¨bius [35, Sections 3.1 and 8.1].
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3. A Diffie-Hellman exchange allows both to compute the same value
c = H(S):
c = H(S) = H(r.B) = H(b.R) mod Q
4. The ephemeral private key which only the receiver can compute (thus
avoiding the “sender-spends” attack) is then:
c+ b = (H(b.R) + b) mod Q
and the publicly visible address which will appear on the blockchain
(and which both can compute) will be no longer H(S).G but B +
H(S).G:
H(S).G+B = H(r.B).G+B = H(b.R).G+ b.G ∈ E(IFP )
5. The receiver monitors the blockchain for transactions that include
a publication of some R value (for example after an op return
in Bitcoin),53 and for such transactions he or she can compute the
private key as (H(b.R) + b) mod Q and spend the coins.
3.9 Dual-Key Improved Stealth Address Methods
An important enhancement to S.A. methods are Dual-Key methods. The
oldest description of such a technique we are aware of is the CryptoNote
paper [44]. Figure 3 illustrates the following short description of a Dual-
Key S.A. method used in many current systems such as Monero (see also
[18, Slides 31–40]):
1. The recipient has a S.A. in the form of two public keys (hence the
name “Dual-Key”):
– a “scan” public key V (sometimes called a “view” key [18]), and
– a “spend” public key B.
As in the previous notation used above, we have: V = v.G and
B = b.G
2. V and B will be points on an elliptic curve and will typically have
33 bytes, whereas the scalars v, b will typically require only 32 bytes.
3. The master stealthy public key advertised by the receiver of coins
is B, V . None of these keys ever appears in the blockchain, only the
sender and the receiver know B, V .
4. The sender uses a one-time nonce pair r,R such that R = r.G, and
r ← random mod Q.
5. A Diffie-Hellman exchange allows both the sender and the recipient
to compute a shared secret value c = H(S):
c = H(S) = H(r.V ) = H(v.R) mod Q
6. However the ephemeral private key which only the receiver can com-
pute is:
c+ b = (H(v.R) + b) mod Q
and the publicly visible address which will appear on the blockchain
(which sender, receiver and an auditor — see below — can compute)
is the address with public key equal to H(S).G+B and:
H(S).G+B = H(r.V ).G+B = H(v.R).G+ b.G ∈ E(IFP )
53 The publication of R in a transaction increases memory usage on the blockchain and
could be prone to censorship [49]. A major alternative is go back to using some more
permanent keys for the sender a,A instead of r,R, cf. [18]. cf. [49, 18].
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Fig. 3. A fresh destination address in a Dual-Key S.A. [18,
Slides 33–44].
7. The auditor, proxy server or read-only (hot) wallet actively monitor-
ing the events, knows the pair B, v. The auditor actively monitors
the blockchain for transactions which include a publication of some
R value, and for such transactions he or she can compute
pk = H(v.R).G+B ∈ E(IFP )
and see if this pk or its hash appears in the blockchain.
8. The auditor is not able to spend coins because he does not know
b. Only the recipient knows b and can compute sk = H(v.R) + b
mod Q and spend these coins.
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4 Proposed Solutions Adding Privacy to
Crypto Currency
Practical implementations of crypto currency privacy differ very substan-
tially in how they approach the privacy problem. For example, consider
the following four major directions in blockchain privacy:
1. Dash is the simplest low tech co-operative solution which encourages
peer mixing. It does not use advanced cryptography.
2. In Mo¨bius the S.A. technique is extremely basic: money is sent not
to a user but to a custodian smart contract, and ring signatures
are used at withdrawal stage providing (with caveats)54 very strong
anonymity for the receiver.
3. In CryptoNote 2.0 (e.g. inside the original Monero crypto currency),55
ring signatures are used to conceal the identity of senders, and a so-
phisticated dual-key S.A. technique is used in order to conceal the
identity of receivers.
4. ZCash uses Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs. Until now 56 ZCash used
a very simple (not very strong) S.A. technique which was combined
with Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof techniques for better security. This
ZK proof technology plays the same role as Ring Signatures in Mon-
ero, except that it is stronger: it convinces the blockchain that some
user has the spending private key without revealing which user it is
for a substantially larger number of users (say 1 million). By con-
trast: in Monero the size of this set would be restricted to perhaps 4
or 1157 because otherwise the transaction would become excessively
long (and storage on the Monero blockchain is quite expensive).
In this section we consider how cryptographic approaches to privacy have
been implemented in practice, with examples drawn primarily from 2
(Mo¨bius) and 4 (CryptoNote 2.0). Both use ring signatures and are based
on traditional widely-studied 1990s cryptography.58 If CryptoNote 2.0 or
the current version or Mo¨bius are insecure, it is very likely that there will
be a way to engineer around the problem and fix it. In contrast, ZCash is
based on cryptographic assumptions which are so unusual and so new,59
even for professional cryptographers, that there is a risk that ZCash
might cryptographically collapse overnight (and because this technology
is so immature, it is likely that it would then be beyond obvious repair).60
54 For example, if we ignore events and S.A. communication which happened before the
withdrawal, and also if we ignore the actions of participants after the withdrawals,
for example aggregating different payments into larger amounts.
55 This applies to an earlier original stage of development of Monero, as it seems that
the primary goal of Monero was to implement the CryptoNote protocol. Monero has
later been developed further in order to conceal the amounts inside the transactions.
56 ZeroCash has had a very major upgrade in late 2018.
57 For example the mandatory ring size is now 11 since Monero v8 as of October 2018.
58 However, security and privacy in a real-life setting is a lot more complex.
59 See Section 5.3. Furthermore, the assumptions appear far-fetched: they appear to
have have been bent in order to achieve a very ambitious result.
60 In the same way as most 1990s standardized hash functions, most older stream
ciphers based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), and most discrete log-
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4.1 Implementing Ring Signatures
CryptoNote and Mo¨bius operate in different ways: for example, CryptoNote
uses a ring signature to hide the identity of the sender, whereas Mo¨bius
uses a ring signature to hide the identity of the receiver.
CryptoNote. The basic operation of CryptoNote, e.g. in Monero [44],
is illustrated in Figure 4 and explained below:
– The intended receiver of a transfer generates a new Stealth Address
(a method that can generate multiple public/private key pairs) and
sends the S.A. to the intended sender via an off-chain communication
channel.
– The sender generates a fresh one-time destination address DPKi
derived from the stealth address provided in the previous step.
– The sender irreversibly sends money (crypto tokens) to this destina-
tion address.
– A ring signature is used to hide the identity of the sender by forcibly
mixing the Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) which actually
belongs to the sender with UTXOs from some other senders (all of
which are visible).
– A crucial part of the ring signature scheme used here to authenticate
this transaction is a “key image” (also known as a “linking tag” —
see Section 3.3). It identifies the sender’s private key and it may be
used only once in order to prevent double spending, i.e. multiple use)
of any initial UTXOs61.
– Any UTXO might be used as a passive (dummy) input in a several
ring signatures before it is finally spent. The actual spending of the
UTXO might be revealed later to a third-party observer, thereby
leading to knowledge about previous ring signatures (since the ob-
server can infer that the UTXO must have been passive in previous
ring signatures). Or the UTXO might be part of a subsequent ring
signature, in which case its presence in the previous ring signature
can be inferred to have been passive. However, an observer might
equally well never have such information revealed (no one except
that owners would know if certain UTXOs were spent). Thus dif-
ferent third-party observers might have different information about
UTXOs. Fortunately the counterparties to a transaction that spends
a UTXO will always have full information about that spending; the
integrity of the transaction is assured, and there will be settlement
finality.
– Although a UTXO input to a ring signature appears to come from
any one of the users involved in the ring signature, the key im-
age uniquely determines the user for whom further spending of the
UTXO is prohibited — the others are passive (or “virtual”) and
arithms in finite fields, have been compromised to a vast extent by cryptography
researchers.
61 If the system adheres to certain global constraints on the usage of public keys then
this should prevent double spending however the exact specification and encoding
of what is allowed is a potential source of ambiguities and implementation mistakes.
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there is no consequent spending constraint on any of the other users
involved in the ring. However, there may be unintended consequences
for users who are involved as passive inputs into a ring signature,
since their involvement is public and all users will known that there
is a possibility that each user in the ring signature might really be
spending that money at that time.
– This mechanism needs to be carefully engineered and carefully im-
plemented: so that the double processing attempts are always re-
vealed and yet the disclosure of this “key image” reveals nothing
more than a random number deterministically linked to the iden-
tity of the receiver (and that there is no subtle ambiguity such as
duplicate signatures that might actually enable double spending).62
– The receiver’s funds are now completely settled. He can withdraw
the amount from the Monero transaction using the receiver’s “private
DPKi” at any later moment.
Fig. 4. The basic principle of CryptoNote, e.g. in Monero [44]. The
receiver sends a Stealth address to the sender, and Ring Signatures
are used at the deposit stage to hide the identity of the sender. The
use of a once-only key image prevents double processing of a deposit.
Mo¨bius. At the heart of Mo¨bius is a deterministic Ethereum contract
which accepts deposits from different participants and accepts a ring
signature on behalf of each withdrawing user (who remains anonymous).
It also uses the Key Image I, to protect against processing the same
withdrawal twice. The basic principle of Mo¨bius [35] is illustrated in
Figure 5 and is explained below:
– Initially it is crucial that the sender is able to ascertain the authen-
ticity of some public key which belongs to the receiver, so that he
62 For example imagine that the implementation of the V erif() function is not entirely
correct in certain rare cases where, perhaps due to a bug in the CPU causing an in-
teger to overflow in a certain way, two transactions with the same I will be accepted.
This would enable double spending.
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can receive an authenticated message from the receiver without a
risk of that message having been spoofed.
– The receiver communicates to the sender his “master” public key in
the form of a Stealth Address transmitted outside of the blockchain.
– The sender can now use this master public key in order to compute
fresh keys for which the receiver is able to compute the private keys.
– This master key has an important capacity to be used more than
once. For a new transaction, the sender derives (using a child key
derivation technique) a new stealth public key from the receiver’s
master public key.
– The sender irreversibly sends funds (crypto tokens) to the smart
contract (acting as a custodian of funds) using the address “public
DPKi” denoted by the stealth address derived in the previous step.
– The receiver can withdraw the amount from the smart contract via a
ring signature using the receiver’s “private DPKi”. The ring signa-
ture hides the identity of the receiver by co-operatively mixing this
transaction with other transactions, and checks that the transaction
does not link to any signature previously used to withdraw from the
contract.6364
Fig. 5. The basic principle of Mo¨bius [35]. The receiver sends a
Stealth address to the sender, and Ring Signatures are used at the
withdrawal stage to hide the identity of the receiver. The use of a
once-only key image prevents double processing of a withdrawal.
Implementing the key image. There are other very substantial
differences between the type of ring signatures used in CryptoNote and
63 [35] describes two methods, the second of which uses a key image (“linking tag”),
the advantage of the latter method being described in terms of reduced storage cost.
64 It is also stated in [35, Page 11] that the smart contract checks whether “the stealth
public key is valid (i.e., has an associated secret key that can be used to withdraw
from the contract)” — it is not at all clear how this could be checked without
compromising the privacy of the recipient.
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in Mo¨bius. A fundamental difference lies in what is included as d in the
key image formula I = f(a, d) (see Section 3.3). CryptoNote implements
a modified ring signature scheme by Fujisaki and Suzuki [26] where d
is essentially empty, which means that processing the same transaction
from the same user twice is always detected. Mo¨bius implements an-
other differently modified ring signature scheme by Franklin and Zhang
[25] where d is essentially the set R of public keys, which means that pro-
cessing the same transaction from the same user twice is detected only
if it occurs when processing a withdrawal twice from the same smart
contract with the same group (ring) of public keys.
Performance of Ring Signature Implementations. The cost in
terms of blockchain occupation for most known ring signature implemen-
tations grows linearly with the number of participants N in a transaction
(which also defines the anonymity set). For example, in Mo¨bius generally
if each smart contract processes roughly one withdrawal for each of the
N participants, and if each withdrawal has a signature of size C ·N , this
implies a basic cost of C ·N2. In practice the number of withdrawal events
might be increased due to the need for additional dummy transactions
for obfuscation (a possible practical overall cost might be say 10 ·C ·N2).
4.2 Implementing Stealth Addresses in Mo¨bius
In the Mo¨bius paper [35] the proposed “Stealth Address” method has
very restricted functionality. The main intention is said to be to reduce
the off-chain communication required to generate shared secrets65 and
to create multiple freshly-derived public keys based on a master public
key, a single shared secret, and an incrementing nonce.
This is similar in some respects to an excessively simple66 form of S.A.
method proposed in [19] and interestingly makes some arguments about
its security or randomness. Some highly relevant improvements for Mo¨bius
are suggested in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2.
65 [35, Section 4.4, Page 11] states: If communication overhead were not a concern, the
system would work the same if, instead of Alice deriving a new key for Bob in a
non-interactive fashion, Bob simply sent a fresh key to Alice to use.
66 Compared with advanced S.A. techniques seen elsewhere in the literature [44, 19, 15,
16, 28]. The actual technique described in [19, Section 2.3] is better described as a
simple Child Key Derivation (CKD) method — see Figure 1.
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5 Discussion
This section provides discussion of issues relating to privacy, liquidity
and settlement risk; issues relating to cryptography in general (especially
“crypto magic”); and issues relating to the implementation of crypto-
graphic methods.
5.1 Improving Mo¨bius
Here we discuss some ways in which Mo¨bius could be improved, and
the problem of providing both high privacy (optional or on demand) and
high liquidity (also optional), which is difficult to achieve simultaneously.
Privacy, Liquidity and Settlement Risk. Mo¨bius uses a smart
contract (a “tumbler”) to provide privacy via ring signatures. But the
privacy provided by a ring signature is proportional to the number of
other available public keys with which the real transaction’s public key
can be mixed (if there are no other available public keys, there can be
no privacy) and similarly the privacy provided by a “tumbler” smart
contract is proportional to the number of transactions it can “tumble”
(if there is only one transaction, there is no privacy). This therefore leads
to two important questions:
Question 1: Do we make privacy obligatory? i.e. do we enforce users
to only use the tumbler for all transactions, and do we enforce users
to do so frequently (perhaps including dummy transactions)? Or is
it not obligatory (in which case would there be financial incentives
to use the tumbler — e.g. reduced transactiom fees)?67
Question 2: If the tumbler smart contract has control of the funds until
they are withdrawn, has the tumbler taken legal ownership of the
coins as an intermediate step? Or is the tumbler holding the coins
“on trust” for the sender (so that if there is a problem the funds will
revert to the sender)? Or is the tumbler holding the coins “on trust”
for the recipient (so that if there is a problem the funds will always be
made available to the recipient to withdraw)? Having the tumbler
“take ownership” as an intermediate step raises interesting issues
since in a truly decentralised system multiple copies of the smart
contract might be running one on each node, so the ring signature
smart contract might be effectively owned by everyone (and thus
everyone might be liable for losses caused by the smart contract
malfunctioning). The ability and mechanism to recover coins that
were lost or stolen while in the ring signature smart contract is a
67 Further examples include: withdrawals could be free after a certain period of time
and deposits which are very close to each other in timing could also be encouraged
for better privacy. This might suggest making both senders and receivers pay some
fee as both can compromise the privacy of others if their actions are excessively
contingent to other events in networks and markets.
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feature that need further consideration (including how to determine
what rectification steps to take under what circumstances).
The answer to Question 1 may have important implications for the liq-
uidity of funds (see below), and the answer to Question 2 may have
important implications for assessing settlement risk and counterparty
risk (see below).68
Question 2 will no doubt be determined contractually for a permissioned
DLT in a corporate environment, but those corporate users will require
highly competent advice from lawyers who understand how the technol-
ogy works and what questions to ask; and for crypto currencies handling
consumer payments new statutory provisions for consumer protection
may be required. There is also a technical aspect relating to Question 2:
what should the tumbler smart contract do if it detects that there are
insufficient transactions to be tumbled, and it cannot therefore provide
a required level of privacy? Whilst this is not part of the current Mo¨bius
specification, it should be considered for any implementation of Mo¨bius.
There are at least four possible options for this technical aspect:
2.1 The tumbler continues to process the few transactions that it con-
trols, with little or no privacy benefit, and each recipient may with-
draw his or her funds immediately. Thus, transactions never fail but
privacy is not imposed or not obligatory.
2.2 The tumbler refuses to process when there are too few transactions
on the grounds that it cannot provide sufficient privacy. Such trans-
actions would fail and the funds would need to be returned to the
senders.69
2.3 The tumbler delays processing the few transactions that it controls
until there are sufficient other transactions in the tumbler to guar-
antee privacy. This introduces additional and unpredictable delays
in liquidity provision to the recipient (and may also increase settle-
ment risk subject to the issue of ownership, and perhaps require a
backstop of returning the coins to the sender).
2.4 Each transaction could include a field to indicate how it wishes to be
processed in the case of a depleted tumbler — either to be processed
without privacy, or to be failed, or to be delayed. The problem with
this solution is that both sender and receiver must agree on the
setting for the transaction.
The answer to Question 1 will affect the likelihood of this problem occur-
ring, but cannot avoid the problem completely. In general these issues are
not discussed in the Mo¨bius paper, which further complicates matters by
stating that the set of users in the ring signature should be specified in
advance (which is likely to be unacceptably impractical for users). Fur-
thermore, even the very flexible solution given in option 2.4 above does
68 In the latter case, counterparty risk may be present for example if the sender becomes
bankrupt and the courts determine that any transactions in the tumbler at the time
of bankruptcy were part of the sender’s assets (upon which the recipient may have a
claim but that claim must be proved and must be prioritised against other claims).
69 This is potentially easy, since sender UTXOs are not concealed.
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not solve the problem of minimum privacy standards (see Question 1
above). Overall, a more precise specification of the operation of Mo¨bius
is required, following which the “best” solution will depend strongly on
the requirements of the users and on how they would relatively priori-
tise concerns such as privacy, liquidity, and settlement risk. they depend
strongly on the requirements of the users and on how they would rela-
tively prioritise the concerns of privacy, liquidity, and settlement risk.
5.2 The Need for Better Stealth Addresses.
The main goal of all S.A. methods is to send assets or coins to a certain
“publicly visible” master key in such a way that this key does not ap-
pear in the blockchain. The fact that S.A. methods in CryptoNote and
even more in the recent 2018 release of ZeroCash are substantially more
complex than the simplistic CKD in Mo¨bius suggests that Mo¨bius needs
something better.
Here we consider a possible attack on a modified Mo¨bius: . Mo¨bius is
intended for use with Ethereum and does not use R yet. If R is added,
and if we want to store R inside the Ethereum blockchain, we have a
problem because by default R is not authenticated. While we can in
general trust the consistency of execution of Ethereum contracts across
different nodes, we cannot trust all individual Ethereum peers to run
the same code and behave honestly. The very first peer in the network
receiving funds and the extra data R could cheat, and modify R making
it impossible to ever recover the coins (unless we implemented some
extra deposit recovery — see Section 5.1.). We see three major methods
to solve this problem which might lead to a necessity to augment the
Mo¨bius smart contract system:
1. The sender first publishes R in the Ethereum blockchain. Then he
will wait for several blocks to be mined in order to be assured that
this information will not be lost, and only then send money to the
contract (which transaction is irreversible).
2. A more complex solution is to make the payment dependent on this
R and conditional upon the publication of R in an earlier block. It is
clear that such a mechanism can be implemented in programmable
crypto currency but it is not clear if this works in the current version
of Ethereum.
3. We check that the source code of Mo¨bius and Ethereum guarantees
the following property: if the network accepts a signed transaction
with R, the network nodes must know the actual value of R. This
could be difficult when this comes as an upgrade and was not re-
quired beforehand.
At the very least we need to carefully audit the code, or modify both
the Mo¨bius protocol and source code. It would be interesting to explore
how a combination of Mo¨bius and an improved Dual-Key S.A technique
would function. However, we are not yet ready to study this question
because have a major strategic choice to make (noting that these choices
will have very different effects if they are applied to Monero, Bitcoin, or
a crypto currency using Mo¨bius.):
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1. Do we accept that the current Mo¨bius with a simple CKD method
(see Section 4.2) may perhaps be “good enough” (see Section 3.6)?
2. Do we allow the sender to use ephemeral random R, where the sender
will send an extra piece of data R with his or her transaction —
currently a popular method in crypto currencies, e.g. Monero and
Section 3.9, but vulnerable to the attack mentioned above? or
3. Do we go back to Section 3.7 and consider that it is better to
privilege S.A. with more deterministic or more permanent sender
identities which do not need to publish extra informationR necessary
for the recipient to compute his private key? This can be done with
our standard Dual-key technique and we would need to replace r,R
with some more permanent pair a,A.
In the light of the attack described above and the possible necessity to
increase the complexity of the Mo¨bius smart contract, we tentatively
advocate the third solution with a,A which should be an identity previ-
ously used by the sender on the blockchain and which has been published
prior to sending money into the contract by the sender.
5.3 Crypto Maturity and Complexity: Crypto Magic
“Crypto magic” is a folklore term (e.g. [40]) which is sometimes used
to denote advanced cryptographic techniques that are perhaps not fully
understood and are sometimes used in order to achieve a very ambitious
objective. 70 The research community has not spent substantial time
and effort trying to evaluate the security of these solutions, nor have
professional cryptographers claimed these solutions to be secure. This is
a substantial adoption barrier (and for good reason!). In [30] we read:
newcomers to the field would logically expect that the problems that are
used in security proofs come from a small set of extensively studied, nat-
ural problems. But they are in for an unpleasant surprise.. Although [30]
does not apply directly to current blockchain systems, a more relevant ex-
ample is [47], it does present the problem that the modern cryptographic
community does not always try to evaluate the validity of assumptions;
in essence [30] argues that as long as something is “proven” secure it
is published even if the underlying security assumptions are extremely
far-fetched and no one really believes them.
By comparison, traditional 1990s cryptography such as standardized dig-
ital signatures and some more complex derived constructions (such as
Ring Signatures and Stealth Address techniques) are better understood
and would not normally be classed as “crypto magic”. Where there is
additional complexity in a derived construction, the schemes in question
require a security proof (e.g. see the end of Section 3.3).
Table 1 gives advice in the form of “six general rules” for implementors
of cryptographic systems; these are particularly relevant for the imple-
mentation of Mo¨bius and are explained in more detail below:
70 Such as a large anonymity set in ZeroCash. Too good to be true: ZeroCash technology
is so complex and advanced that for a long time the system was insecure – it was
possible to create money out of thin air – and nobody has noticed, cf. [47].
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Table 1. Beware crypto! Six general rules for cryptographic sys-
tems.
1. Beware “common security standards”, which may not be safe.
2. Beware unreported trivial vulnerabilities.
3. Beware cryptographic solutions built on open-source software.
4. Beware schemes that do not have a strong security proof.
5. Beware schemes with unrealistic and impractical security proofs.
6. Beware that security proofs are necessary but not sufficient.
1. There is a broad problem with cryptography-related security stan-
dards being set by people who are not active researchers in cryptog-
raphy and who are therefore not aware of the many vulnerabilities
of cryptographic systems.
As an example, some security “standards” inherited from Bitcoin,
such as SHA-256 and secp256k1, are not safe to use.
The official bitcoin wiki claims that “Bitcoin has a sound basis in
well understood cryptography” [6]. Yet this is incorrect. Despite the
widespread adoption in bitcoin and blockchain systems of SHA-256
and secp256k1, they cannot be said to be “sound” and “well under-
stood”.
– Most hash functions similar to SHA-256 have already been bro-
ken by the academic research community, and since SHA-256 is
less studied it is less well understood and it cannot be assumed
to be more secure [20].
– The specific parameterisation (secp256k1) that Bitcoin uses for
its elliptic-curve cryptography is not safe: not in the limited
sense of safety in respect to the Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (ECDLP) and especially not in the general case
of being safe for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). There is
substantial ongoing discussion of the safety of secp256k1, which
points to confusion and lack of commonly agreed understand-
ing. Bernstein and Lange [4] provide an excellent and accessible
summary of different approaches to ECC and ECDLP and their
conclusion for secp256k1 is that it is not safe.
There are of course commercial imperatives for asserting that crypto-
graphic security standards are “safe”, and the growing digital econ-
omy needs people and firms to believe that cryptography is safe.
However, caution is advised!
2. Many security solutions are flawed, and the cryptography community
is good at publishing papers on novel or highly non-trivial attacks,
but is not so good at publishing trivial problems; either not at all,
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or not until a long time after the attack or problem was first known.
Lenstra et al [32] is an example of an important disclosure of a trivial
vulnerability a long time after it was initially known.
3. Where cryptographic systems are developed using open-source soft-
ware, undetected vulnerabilities in one person’s software may be
assimilated into other software (we might say that open-source de-
velopment can be “infected” by the virus of a cryptographic vulner-
ability). The resulting systems are often asserted and/or assumed to
be secure without any proof or support for that assumption.
4. Many schemes do not have any security proof whatsoever, or may
only have a weak security proof. For example, [21] explains that the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [1] which is
in widespread use in current blockchain systems, only has one weak
security proof.
5. Many security proofs are unrealistic and impractical, either because
they are framed in a highly theoretical context or because their as-
sumptions are unrealistic and/or impractical. Examples include:
– Many security proofs are done in a theoretical setting where a
problem is said to be reducible to another problem for which no
polynomial-time solution is known to exist. Theoretical proofs
of this sort do not consider actual security of concrete instances
(where multiple practical vulnerabilities may exist).
– Many security proofs use a random oracle or ideal cipher or sim-
ilar model, thus they do not take into account pre-computation
and other attacks.
– Some security proofs are simple “sketches” that do not specify
the assumptions used (and perhaps do not specify the exact
result claimed). One example of this approach can be found in
the Appendix of [44].
– Many security proofs such as in [25] rely on decisional assump-
tions which can be weaker than computational assumptions.
– Many security proofs use rewinding techniques and suffer from
the so called ε2 syndrome, which means that a factor of ε2 de-
grades the security reduction. As a result, the system can be
simultaneously theoretically secure and practically insecure (i.e.
broken).
6. Even in the best case (that security proofs such as found and stud-
ied in [35, 44, 26, 25] are tight and have a realistic/concrete setting)
it is possible to see that security proofs still do not mean much be-
yond the fact that a certain digital signature verification formula71
is not completely and egregiously incorrect (such as allowing one
to cheat easily by modifying the Key Image). Security proofs are
necessary and important but they are not sufficient — they do not
protect against strong random attacks, side channel attacks, pre-
computation attacks, attacks on the privacy of different actors, and
implementation bugs (see Sections 3.7 and 5.4) and thus in general
do not replace further detailed security engineering work.
71 For example, Verif in Section 3.3 of this paper.
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5.4 Cryptography Implementation Pitfalls
One of the problems with advanced cryptography solutions is that some-
times their security collapses very very badly if the user omits to check
just one small thing (for example if a number is a prime or if key image I
was correctly formatted). This will require a comprehensive code security
audit, and finding bugs in source code is a task that Rice’s theorem [42]
tells us is impossible to automate in the general case.72 Therefore it is
interesting to list implementation pitfalls explicitly. At least four major
issues (for many of which we had put into light a number of conflicting
requirements) were already discussed in Section 3.7. However there is a
lot more. Table 2 gives initial advice in the form of “six implementation
pitfalls” which could befall an implementation of Mo¨bius or CryptoNote
or any other crypto currency seeking to implement cryptographic solu-
tions for privacy, and these pitfalls (which are illustrative and not an
exhaustive list) are explained in more detail below:
Table 2. Beware crypto! Six implementation pitfalls for cryp-
tographic systems.
1. Beware failure to digitally sign key parameters. Verify primality
and all ECC parameters.
2. Beware missing validation or verification steps.
3. Beware perturbation attacks.
4. Beware the use of common crypto libraries.
5. Beware using the wrong verification ordering.
6. Beware “rogue” third-party code.
1. If the elliptic curve parameters such as P , Q, the base point G, and
the equation parameters a, b, c, and d are not authentic then security
collapses and the system can be hacked. These key parameters should
therefore be digitally signed, preferably using standard Public Key
Infrastructure methods such as a static (persistent) signature inside a
certificate. The primality of P andQ should also be verified. It should
be clear who generated these parameters, how they were generated,
in order to avoid potential backdoors.
72 In addition to Rice’s theoretic result regarding an automatic procedure, it may be
extremely difficult or impossible to achieve manually, due to the mathematical hard-
ness of deciding whether a computer program has a certain property, if cryptography
is correctly understood, or from incertitude about how the code will be compiled and
optimized, and how it will be executed by hardware.
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2. In ECDSA signatures there is the following implementation danger
[7]:
– The ECDSA verification of a signature (r, s) includes a check
that r is not zero.
– If this check is dropped, then there is a possibility that party
who chose G can have chosen G in such a way to make some
signature (0, s) valid for a particular message m.
3. The same elliptic curve parameters P , Q, and G should be stored
in a redundant way with on-the-fly correctness verification in or-
der to prevent perturbation attacks such as DFA (Differential Fault
Analysis [13]) or RowHammer [14].
4. In Mo¨bius, the key image depend on the ring description R which is a
set of public keys (see Section 3.3). A subtle implementation pitfalls
lie here. Imagine that the same crypto library is used to implement
both systems leading to certain things being done internally in a way
not apparent to the developer. In a well-known annotated version of
the CryptoNote white paper,73 at the top of Page 17 (“Comments
on Page 9”) it is recommended to permute public keys using a pseu-
dorandom number generator in order not to append our key as the
last in order (revealing the sender). Now if we import this seem-
ingly innocent advice to Mo¨bius, which uses a different formula for
computing that key image which hashes the ring description, we will
enable multiple withdrawals because uniqueness of R as a string of
bytes for the same ring (as a mathematical set of public keys) will
be broken.
5. There may be a specific order in which different verifications need
to be done: On Page 10 of [44] it is explicitly explained that the
linkability algorithm is run after checking the signature verification
equation. Is this recommendation important? We are not quite sure.
The reason for this could be that linking tags need to be stored and
checking them first would allow one to have a timing side channel
in order to detect if some linking tags were perhaps lost or not de-
tected as being repeated (the first check is harder to pass). Possibly
a RowHammer [14] or other active side-channel attack could pertur-
bate the storage or key images previously used. Then a successful
attack would need to test which previously-used tags were erased or
modified. This is a strong attack in the sense that modifying random
memory cells at random can allow monetary gain.
6. The use of third-party software may introduce unwitting or mali-
cious errors. For example, a third-party process (e.g. a rogue Mo¨bius
wallet) might contain a virus or malware, which could for example
be enabled after installation as a result of a “social engineering” at-
tack. Thus, after the user has signed a transaction, the malware could
cause that transaction to be altered such as altering the recipient of
coins. A thorough code audit is required for all software, including
all third-party software and runtime anomaly detection and software
integrity checks could also be needed.
73
https://downloads.getmonero.org/whitepaper annotated.pdf
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6 Conclusion
Distributed Ledger (DL) systems are proposed as a way to engineer fu-
ture financial systems. In this paper we have looked at the issue of adding
privacy to DL with a focus on how “Ring Signatures” and related tech-
niques improve the privacy of token transfers. We observe that two emi-
nent exemplars (Mo¨bius and CryptoNote) use these cryptographic tech-
niques in radically different ways. Of the two, Mo¨bius is more recent and
operates in a more co-operative way (with permission). Our initial anal-
ysis and discussion of privacy requirements in the context of financial
markets suggests that adding privacy is (somewhat surprisingly) implied
by the high price of disclosure (blockchain space) and/or the threat of
data mining (for profit). We have investigated whether these techniques
are fit for purpose, which has led us to an elucidation of privacy require-
ments for financial and payment use cases. Substantial difficulties remain
as the cryptographic protocols avoid the difficult questions of (i) setup
and trust and (ii) off-chain channels, and furthermore (iii) it is not fully
specified how various systems should operate in practice. Either way it
is clear that privacy conflicts and interacts here with the important is-
sues of liquidity and performance and that speed and privacy are rather
extremely difficult to achieve simultaneously.
Cryptographic technologies such as Mo¨bius and CryptoNote offer the
possibility to improve privacy in trading and settlement environments
where trust is low. Privacy engineering via Ring Signatures is a form of
signer obfuscation, but cryptographic obfuscation does not provide the
security guarantees as good as with encryption (cryptography does not
solve all practical problems equally well). Ring Signature obfuscation pro-
vides ambiguity whose strength is limited by the number of participants
in the ring and can be eroded with time as more information is revealed
(since privacy relating to users tends to be partial and less easy to con-
trol). Overall, crypto currency systems have complex inter-connections
between integrity, performance, privacy and functionality; this makes
them brittle. Furthermore, cryptography itself, and its implementation,
is fragile: most cryptography results are provisional rather than finally
and convincingly secure. The more complex the cryptography becomes,
the more difficult it becomes to know if the source code is correct. Al-
though the security of Digital Signatures is well understood, the security
of Ring Signatures as modified or adapted in practice is hard to ascer-
tain beyond any reasonable doubt. Cryptography and security can fail
in many ways due to incorrect trust or setup assumptions, specification
or coding ambiguities, failures with adverse events during operation, or
failures to perform checks. We recommend a full code audit and yet we
must warn that it may fail to address all crypto and security problems
at an early stage. Clearly better crypto education is required, and also
robust security engineering under the principle that various assumptions
can and probably will fail. Our advice is best summarised in Section 5
as “Beware Crypto!”.
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